January 2010
Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. Vs. Commission on Elections and Susana M. Caballes
The Court takes judicial notice that the COMELEC, in light of, and expressly adverting to, Aguilar, promulgated on August 4, 2009 Resolution No. 8654. With regard to the determination of the sufficiency and timely payment of the appeal fees as requisite for the perfection of appeals, the Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to consider and adopt the following guidelines on (a) the payment of appeal fees and (b) the disposition of motions for reconsideration; to wit:
1. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfectedupon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the PhP 1,000-appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appealand does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
2. If the appellant filed his appeal before the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall be directed to pay the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice from the Commission, in accordance with Resolution No. 8486. If the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then shall the appeal be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Celestino A. Martinez III Vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon
Section 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. - In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voters' will:
4. When two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot, all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of them, unless one is a surname of an incumbent who has served for at least one year in which case it shall be counted in favor of the latter.
When two or more words are written on different lines on the ballot all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates bearing the same surname for an office for which the law authorizes the election of more than one and there are the same number of such surnames written as there are candidates with that surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of all the candidates bearing the surname.
Sps. Jesus Fajardo and Emer Fajardo Vs. Anita R. Flores, assisted by her husband, Bienvenido Flores
R.A. No. 3844, Sec. 24, provides that:
Sec. 24, Right to a Home Lot . – The agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity of this Code, which shall be considered as included in the leasehold.
In the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
People of the Philippines
Appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations was not violated.
The only issue raised by the appellant in this petition is that his conviction for the sale and possession of shabu, despite the fact that what was established and proven was the sale and possession of ephedrine, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him since the charges in the Informations are for selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
JESUS M. CALO, v e r s u s COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and RAMON “MONCHING RMC” M. CALO
G.R. No. 185222 January 19, 2010
This case could have been an ordinary election contest. However, despite the rather technical issue that we are tasked to resolve here, this case shows that, while blood is usually thicker than water, politics, in some very few instances, may actually be thicker than blood and may be no respecter even of family ties.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, based on the following grounds:
A. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding, through the questioned Resolutions dated 30 July 2008 and 13 November 2008, that the RTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing that Special Order dated 15 February, 2008.
B. The petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief from the Honorable Supreme Court.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Section 11, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC sets the standards in the grant or denial of a motion for execution pending appeal in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, to wit –
SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
(1) Constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
(2) Be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed.
The Court also stressed in “Pecson case” that disruption of public service cannot per se be a basis to deny execution pending appeal –
In the recent case of Pecson v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
x x x decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
We additionally note that “disruption of public service” necessarily results from any order allowing execution pending appeal and is a concern that this Court was aware of when it expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in and cannot be per se a basis to deny execution pending appeal.
Similarly in this case, the COMELEC should have accorded respect and weight to the RTC’s decision proclaiming petitioner as winner. Note that aside from the evidence presented by the parties during the election contest and the expert testimony of the witnesses from the National Bureau of Investigation, the RTC made its own assessment and findings on the contested ballots. On the basis of all this, the RTC concluded that “[petitioner] will still have the plurality of 981 votes in favor of [petitioner] and 315 votes also for [petitioner], respectively.” It was also the RTC’s conclusion that “the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.” Aside from these, the RTC also laid down the superior circumstances necessitating the grant of execution pending appeal:
(1) Allowing the status quo to continue would unjustly give premium to the perpetrators of fraud, anomalies and irregularities and suppress the will of the electorate;
(2) The sovereign will of the people should be given utmost respect and
(3) The injury or damage to be sustained by petitioner would outweigh the injury or damage of respondent.
Given that the RTC’s exercise of its discretionary power to grant execution pending appeal per special order dated February 15, 2008 was not tainted with any bias or capricious and whimsical arbitrariness, we find that the COMELEC committed an error in annulling and setting it aside.
PAULINO M. ALECHA and PRECIOSO M. TAPITAN, v e r s u s ELMER BEN V. PASION, RODOLFO et al.
G.R. No. 164506 January 19, 2010
On September 12, 2003, petitioners Paulino M. Alecha and Precioso M. Tapitan filed before the Ombudsman (Mindanao) a criminal complaint against respondent municipal officials of the Municipality of Midsalip
In their letter-complaint, petitioners averred that respondent municipal officials conspired in unlawfully adopting and actually collecting the salaries, representation and travel allowances (RATA) and personnel economic relief assistance (PERA) of public officials for special cities and/or first class provinces or cities, notwithstanding the fact that the Municipality of Midsalip had no financial capacity to cover such expenditures, thus seriously affecting the delivery of basic services within its jurisdiction.
In sum, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman (Mindanao ) in dismissing the letter-complaint of petitioners against respondent municipal officials. Settled is the rule that the findings of fact of the Ombudsman, when duly supported by evidence, are conclusive. Findings of fact of administrative bodies (which are equipped with expertise as far as their jurisdiction is concerned) should be accorded not only respect but even finality when supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
We have time and again refrained from interfering with the Ombudman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. This is in recognition of the Office of the Ombudsman’s independence and initiative in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it.
One last word. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.Corollary to this heavy burden, however, is the right of public officials to be protected from unfounded suits.
the petition is hereby DISMISSED
Alba v. Nitoreda, G.R. No. 120223, 13 March 1996, 254 SCRA 753, 765.
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON, versus Del Castillo, Abad, and Perez, JJ.
SPS. SANTOS
G.R. No. 185240 January 20, 2010
Section 152 (c), Local Government Code:
Barangay Clearance - No city or municipality may issue any license or permit for any business or activity unless a clearance is first obtained from the Barangay where such business or activity is located or conducted. For such clearance, the Sangguniang Barangay may impose a reasonable fee. The application for clearance shall be acted upon within seven (7) working days from the filing thereof. In the event that the clearance is not issued within the said period, the city or municipality may issue the said license or permit.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION,
versus JUNG KEUN PARK @ JUNGGEUN PARK @ CHUNG KEUNPARK G.R. No. 159835
January 21, 2010
Non-immigrants are required by law to present valid passports and visas upon entry into the Philippines
All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas prior to their admission into the Philippinesunder Section 10 of the Immigration Act:
Section 10. Non-immigrants must present for admission into the Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in the nature of passports issued by the governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, and valid passport visas granted by diplomatic or consular officers, except that such document shall not be required of the following aliens: (a) a child qualifying as a non-immigrant, born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of the accompanying parent, the visa not having expired; and (b) a seaman qualifying as such under section (9) of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer designated by him or the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: x x x x
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines
We conclude this case by recognizing and pointing out certain aspects that the BID may, in its discretion, still want to look into. Section 29 (a) of the Immigration Act states:
Section 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines
(15) Persons who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, however, That the Commissioner of Immigration shall not exercise his discretion in favor of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude or for any crime penalized under sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act or on the ground of having engaged in hoarding, black-marketing of profiteering unless such aliens have previously resided in the Philippine immediately before his exclusion or deportation for a period of ten years or more or are married to a native Filipino woman;
As a rule, an alien is barred from re-entering the territory of the deporting State. However, States may, upon proper application, waive previous deportation orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the re-entry and readmission of the alien do not pose a risk to the general welfare. As stated in the quoted provision above, the Commissioner of Immigration may exercise sound discretion in the readmission of previously excluded aliens (subject to certain limitations). After Park was first deported back to Korea on July 24, 2000 on the strength of the July 6, 2000 letter, he returned to the Philippines
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer designated by him or the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
x x x x
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines
JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180870 January 22, 2010
In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances. However, in our desire to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere to the constitutional pronouncement that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This case illustrates once more our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement.
That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any license or authority, in violation of the aforesaid law.
As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case, we will not hesitate to review the same. In this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession.
We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found not only glaring inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
The testimonies of the prosecution’s principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.
Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out the contents of the plastic bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature written on a masking tape attached to the plastic sachet. At no instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet contained the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the “corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential”.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of the seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain.
Finally, petitioner’s defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and commonly used in drug-related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
G.R No. 188078. January 25, 2010
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos provides:
SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population sizes Pursuant to Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local Government Code.
(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data that it has collected and processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated.
(b) For census years, certification on population size will be based on actual population census counts; while for the intercensal years, the certification will be made on the basis of a set of demographic projections or estimates declared official by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).
(c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the census reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal population estimates will be as of middle of every year.
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections.
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population size may be issued will be the barangay for census population counts, and the city or municipality for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own population census, during off–census years, approval must be sought from the NSCB and the conduct must be under the technical supervision of NSO from planning to data processing.
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010,” violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be “as of the middle of every year.” In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that “the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” Based on the Certification’s own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces.
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, “the population of the Municipality of Malolos
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections.
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos Malolos
On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, “The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts.” Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the “aim of legislative apportionment is ‘to equalize population and voting power among districts.’”
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: “Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx.” (Emphasis supplied)
There is no basis to compound the growth rate of a population over a three-year period because the children born during the three-year period could not possibly give birth to their own children.
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